7 E.g., Ryle 1949; Prior 1985; Armstrong, Martin, and Place 1996; Mumford 1998; Fara 2005 . It would be convenient for my view if dispositions caused their manifestations, but I am not committed to that. If the vase's fragility causes it to break when dropped, so also does the belief that P cause the assertion that P. If not, we need an error theory in both cases. I would also consider the metaphysical jujitsu move of simply identifying the attitude, token-token, with whatever happens to be the categorical basis of the relevant bits of the individual's current dispositional structure, if that delivers the desired facts about causation. Dispositional Attitudes, p. 9 be more central to the cluster and others more peripheral; and the contributing dispositional elements might not be entirely discrete.
A property might be regarded as characteristic even if it's not actually characteristic. It might be stereotypical of fashion models, and yet false on the whole, that they lack verbal wit.
And to say that a property would be regarded as characteristic is not to say that it is actually regarded as characteristic. Maybe no one has ever explicitly considered what properties would be characteristic of a nerdish love of squids. But we can readily enough attribute characteristic properties on the spot: pride in one's detailed knowledge of squid biology, pictures of squids in conspicuous places, interest in squid-related internet news, passionate feelings about squidoctopus comparisons, etc. Some stereotypical properties might not be linguistically endorsed in the abstract, but rather only revealed by intuitive judgments about diagnostic cases -one use of clever thought experiments.
Whose hypothetical judgment about the properties characteristic of X constitutes the stereotype for X? For purposes of this paper, I'll treat as the default our well-educated Englishspeaking peers. However, for novel or half-novel or sub-culturally local property types ("alief" per Gendler 2008a-b; "narcissistic", when the term was first introduced; being a hard-nosed reductive materialist) a narrower peer group will often be appropriate.
Just as one might have a disposition despite failing to manifest it due to a countervailing force or failure of normality, one might excusably fail to possess some of the dispositions in a stereotype. There is no principled ontological divide between dispositions broadly specified and more narrowly specified dispositions gathered together in clusters. Ceteris paribus defeasibility of a portion of a broad disposition, then, can be tantamount to ceteris paribus defeasibility of the entirety of a narrowly specified disposition within a larger cluster. with Benjy if Benjy is dead -one might be disposed to try to make future plans with Benjy, but that's a different matter -and the disposition to make joint plans might be essential to marital love. Perhaps knowing some fact P involves the capacity to act in a way that reflects sensitivity to the truth of P, a disposition one can't have unless P is true. Maybe being disposed to say "the oceans contain water" with normal semantics requires having had causal contact with H 2 O, such that without having had the right causal contact one cannot fully satisfy the linguistic aspects of the dispositional stereotype for the belief that the oceans contain water. 10 So dispositional properties can perhaps carry more of a load than one would think.
Comparison to Personality Traits. Dispositional Attitudes, p. 11
The present view treats having an attitude as structurally similar to having a personality trait.
To be extraverted, plausibly, is nothing more or less than for one's dispositional profile to match, sufficiently well, the dispositional stereotype for extraversion. Stereotypically, to be extraverted is to enjoy meeting new people, to enjoy parties, to be talkative, and to take the lead in social situations; it is to be uninhibited in expressing one's feelings and to tend to plan ways to bring people together; it is to tend to choose certain types of work and play over others; and so on (all ceteris paribus, of course). Similarly for being courageous or curmudgeonly or Machiavellian or mellow. Having such personality traits is just a matter of matching the characteristic dispositional stereotypes well enough, or so it seems plausible to say.
Compare, now, the attitude of believing that one is God's gift to women. A man who believes this might not be disposed to say to himself, "I am God's gift to women", but he will presumably take for granted his attractiveness to women. He will tend to hold himself with a certain sexual arrogance. He will expect his advances to be favorably received. When his advances are rebuffed he will be prone probably not to surprise (which might render the dispositional structure unstable by correcting him in the long run) but rather to rationalization or quick forgetting. Note that for this attitude, unlike most beliefs, sincere assertion is not central to the stereotype. Note also that the category label employs somewhat fanciful language. The man might be an atheist who in some sense could not literally believe he is God's gift to anyone -and yet there is some belief-like attitude attributed through this fanciful language, an attitude that is probably not precisely captured by any more literal-seeming attributions like "he believes that most women are attracted to him" or "he believes that women are lucky to receive his sexual attention". My thought is that to attribute this belief is to gesture toward a dispositional portrait profile or psychological posture characteristic of believing one is God's gift to women; but it seems misleading to say that a representation with the propositional content "I am God's gift to women" is written in his Belief Box, ready to be accessed and deployed in theoretical and practical inference.
Believing one is God's gift to women might be a borderline case between having an attitude and having a personality trait. The similarity between personality traits and attitudes also appears in other seemingly intermediate cases: wanting constant attention, liking to take it easy, loving children, being unconcerned about the future, being self-confident. Are these broadreaching attitudes or narrow personality traits? If attitudes and personality traits are structurally similar, we might expect such borderline cases. If attitudes and personality traits are entirely different psychological structures, these seemingly borderline cases create classification problems.
Mad Attitudes, Alien Attitudes.
I am recommending an approach to the attitudes that embraces a broad notion of the surface phenomena and then rejects the impulse to go deeper -or rather, as I will explain in the conclusion, rejects that impulse for present purposes. On the "surface", as I define it, are all the stereotypically recognizable features of having an attitude, especially behavioral dispositions, experiential or "phenomenal" dispositions, and dispositions to enter other stereotypically line given its presumably fundamental cognitive or architectural importance. How are we to know whether "the solar system contains more than just the four inner planets" is one of the explicitly stored representations or merely swiftly derivable? And are we simply to take on faith that all the attitudes we properly ascribe are in fact either core or swiftly derivable from the core, or is there some way of testing this claim? The maps view, in contrast, seems to overgenerate beliefs: Presumably I don't believe that there are -i 2 e 0 planets -at least not until after I engage in some mathematical reasoning -though a map presumably represents that fact as much as it represents that there are 8. For related reasons it's a challenge to represent inconsistent beliefs in map-like format.
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I recommend a different approach. The stereotype for believing that the number of planets is eight and the stereotype for believing that the number of planets is one less than nine presumably contain very similar clusters of dispositions, though with somewhat different centers and peripheries. Being disposed to look for the missing planet upon seeing a chart with seven but not upon seeing a chart with eight belongs perhaps equally to both stereotypes, while being disposed to affirm that the number of planets is one less than nine is central to one stereotype and at best peripheral to the other. The farther the belief ascriber's locutions drift from what the subject would tend spontaneously to say and retrospectively agree to, the less neat the subject's fit to the stereotype associated with those locutions and the less apt those locutions will usually be for sketching the subject's psychological posture. Thus, the dispositional stereotype approach can respect the idea, which seems harder to accommodate on a stored-representation view, that what we have here really is just a smooth gradation from the apt to the awkward to the silly.
The Overthrow of Folk Psychology?
You might worry that I have fetishized folk psychology and abandoned empirical The problem is, formal science, right now, does us no better. No brain imagery study yields a more useful set of categories for getting at what we care about in ascribing attitudes; nor does any current representationalist philosophical psychology, except as an optimistic promise or simplistic cartoon sketch of the mind. Only in the cases of "remembering" and "seeing", perhaps, is empirical psychology mature enough to begin to threaten folk psychological patterns of classifying the attitudes. And in these cases, as I suspect we will discover generally, there is no one unified structure undergirding what's picked out by our broad, folk psychological concepts, but rather a misaligned plurality. If the mind is a weird, kludgy chaos of dynamic agonisms and antagonisms, thought might not proceed via the manipulation of representations held in functionally discrete belief and desire boxes, and it might derange both folk psychology and empirical science to hastily assimilate the categories of one to the other.
Already now, though, science can legitimately lead us to adjust our superficial stereotypes, either by producing entirely new stereotypes or by modifying existing stereotypical structures to incorporate rising knowledge. Psychological research on sexism, for example, can coin a new type -"the implicit sexist" -and also modify our existing stereotypes of sexism and egalitarianism simpliciter. Folk psychological stereotypes won't sit still, anyway, and are always to some extent influenced by scholarship and science, hence "phlegmatic", "extravert", "agnostic", and our post-Freudian sense of how desires might manifest.
Modifications of folk psychology inevitably venture beyond mere cool description. Our folk categories are to an extent normatively self-fulfilling: Because we have them, we live into them, and for the most part we rightly feel we should live into them. We shape ourselves toward the stereotypical pattern of the baseball lover, the political liberal, the Wittgensteinian, the person who values higher education. By regulating ourselves accordingly, we become more predictable 
